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I expand on and defend a particular account of silencing that has been identified by Mary Kate 
McGowan. She suggests that one sort of silencing occurs when men do not think that women have 
the authority to refuse. I develop this proposal, arguing that it is usefully distinct from other forms 
of silencing, which attribute a radical misunderstanding to the perpetrator. Authority silencing, by 
contrast, allows that the perpetrator understands that the woman is trying to refuse. I examine the 
nature of authority, and of refusal, and argue that a normatively binding refusal requires authority, 
the normative capacity to make a determination that has a ‘because I said so’ structure. Women’s 
authority in this sense is fragile. Authority to refuse sexual advances can be lost through women’s 
attire, how much they have had to drink, location, or their profession. This account makes sense of 
the way that perpetrators both do and do not understand sexual refusal, and explains how they are 





In one sort of case where a man rapes a woman, the perpetrator knows perfectly well that the victim 
refuses to have sex, and he overrides her refusal, by force or coercion.<1>  In the Anglo-American 
legal system, and in many other legal systems, this is the definition of rape. But it is not the only sort 
of non-consensual sexual encounter, and it is not always the case that the man has a clear grasp of 
the woman’s refusal. As feminists have long argued, ideals of heterosexual sex are problematically 
entwined with gender hierarchies, and this leads to what Ann Cahill calls the ‘heteronormative 
continuum’ (2014, 303) between consensual sex and sexual assault.  Date rape and acquaintance rape 
do not involve a sudden transformation of a normal man into a savage monster. Rather, societal 
norms around heterosexual sex make various degrees of forcible seduction seem an acceptable part 
of heteronormative interaction. Both men and women may hold problematic attitudes about 
women’s sexual consent and refusal such that refusals are not understood as they should be. To put 
it another way, women’s sexual refusal is sometimes ‘silenced’ to some degree.  
 In this paper I focus on a particular phenomenon that I think is under-theorized. The 
phenomenon is ‘authority silencing’, as identified by Mary Kate McGowan. McGowan suggests that 
one sort of silencing occurs when men do not think that women have the authority to refuse (2009, 
492 and 2017, 48). My aim in this paper is to develop this proposal, as it illuminates many instances 
of non-consensual sex as well as harassment and semi-consensual interactions. Authority silencing is 
distinct from other sorts of silencing in that, in cases of silencing of sexual refusal, it involves a 
hostile attitude on the part of the perpetrator. This explains why the perpetrator is blameworthy 
 2 
despite his misunderstanding, and makes sense of the real life data (what we know about 





There is a familiar distinction between three things we could mean by talk of silencing. First, it might 
be that someone is not allowed to speak at all, second it might be that they speak, and are 
understood, but their words are ignored or dismissed, and third, is the idea that someone can speak, 
and yet not be comprehensible to others, not through a problem with their speech per se, but 
through something in their circumstances.<2> 
Most recent philosophical work on the topic of silencing has focused on cases where speech is 
permitted, but is not effective in its intended aim. The early literature on the topic was concerned 
with understanding sexual violation in a patriarchal context. For example, Catharine MacKinnon 
argues that pornography encourages false beliefs about women so that ‘no’ is taken as ‘yes’ when 
uttered by a woman in response to a sexual approach (1987).<3>   Lois Pineau argues that our 
myths about rape have it that women do want sex, but feel that they shouldn’t, so (according to the 
myth) they want to be raped in order to take the responsibility of the decision to have sex off their 
shoulders. Thus when a woman says no, she is not being sincere, and in fact she wants the man to 
proceed (1989). Women speak, but they are not heard. Their speech - in particular their sexual 
refusal - is somehow silenced. 
Taking those ideas as a starting point, feminist philosophers have engaged in a more general 
project of elucidating various speech related harms.  Rae Langton (1993) and Jennifer Hornsby 
(1993) influentially deployed Austin’s speech act theory, and in particular, his distinction between 
perlocution and illocution (1975).<4> The perlocutionary effect of a speech act is the effect it 
happens to have on the audience. It might shock or dismay them; it might please them; it might 
contribute to the conditions of their oppression. Illocutions, by contrast, bring something about 
directly. So long as the felicity conditions are met, the right illocution can marry people; promise 
something; name things, and so on. Langton and Hornsby both argue that women’s illocutionary 
speech acts of refusal fail because uptake fails: the man does not understand the refusal.<5> These 
technical suggestions aim to identify and account for the speech related harms that MacKinnon and 
Pineau and other earlier writers allude to. 
My focus here is on understanding what happens when men don’t seem to hear sexual 
refusal. In some cases of rape, there is no misunderstanding at all, refusal is simply ignored. But 
other cases are more complex, and the feminist insight there is that the conditions somehow make 
women’s refusals ambiguous. But where exactly is this ambiguity? Various answers have been 
suggested, which are usefully categorized as different sorts of silencing by McGowan (2017).<6> I 
will begin by briefly explaining why I think the other sorts of silencing are less applicable to real life 
cases than authority silencing.  
McGowan identifies the sort of silencing suggested by Langton as a failure to recognize 
intention to refuse. On this account, the man has internalized a false view about how women 
express refusal. Closely related, is sincerity silencing, which is when the hearer understands that the 
woman is expressing refusal, but believes that women often offer refusals insincerely. As Hornsby 
puts it: “No doubt it requires some explaining how it could become impossible to do a perfectly 
good act of refusing even using a word as well suited for refusal as 'No' is. But this impossibility 
could be explained if we thought that a certain view of women prevailed in some quarters. I mean a 
view according to which women who do not behave with especial modesty or who dress with 
especial circumspection are ready and willing to gratify men's sexual urges, but will feign 
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unwillingness (whether through a pretended decency or through a desire to excite). If there were a 
pervasive view that this is how women conduct themselves, and if the view determined a man's 
expectations, then it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the harmony of speaker's intention 
and audience reception, for which reciprocity generally provides, could be missing.” (1995, 137). 
According to both of these accounts, there is a fairly radical misunderstanding: it is as if 
women’s speech is ‘scrambled’ as Caroline West puts it at one point (2003). Langton even suggests 
that it could be that men rape women without knowing they are doing so. (2009, 58). Let’s call this 
the ‘radical misunderstanding view’. What should we make of the radical misunderstanding view, 
aside from any technical arguments about illocution? Is it plausible that men are so taken in by sexist 
ideological narratives that they become oblivious to the woman’s actual verbal and non-verbal 
signals? 
Total delusion may happen, but it is likely to be rare. There is certainly a lot of sexist 
ideology about, but it does not seem powerful enough to completely obscure the verbal and non-
verbal signals of refusal that are often present in the sorts of case I am focusing on.<7> Most 
people can recognize the expressed intentions of others, at least after some repetition. My claim here 
is not that there is never a radical misunderstanding, it is that it would also be useful to theorize less 
radical misunderstandings in order to shed light on what seems to be the most common sort of case.  
Another intuitively obvious feature of most cases of non-consensual sex is that the 
perpetrator seems blameworthy. When we think of cases where a man misunderstands refusal and 
presses on with sex, we usually imagine that the man deserves blame: that his behavior is culpable. 
But radical misunderstanding (if arrived at non-culpably) would mean that the offender is innocent 
of bad motives, and should not be blamed. This is not how these cases usually appear, so an analysis 
that accounts for blameworthiness is called for.  
The common sense idea that perpetrators have bad motives and are usually blameworthy is 
consonant with empirical data about sexual assault. There is fairly widely shared agreement among 
psychologists who work on sexual violence that there are two groups of characteristics that are good 
predictors for sexual aggression. One is hostile masculinity, the other is impersonal sexual 
orientation, a preference for sex without emotional attachment (Malamuth et al. 1995). Hostile 
masculinity, the trait that is of interest to me here, includes suspicion, distrust and an adversarial 
attitude to women. Hostile masculinity is associated with serious sexual assaults, but also with more 
minor sexual aggression, such as reacting badly to sexual refusals (Woerner et al. 2018). <8>  
These considerations suggest that in many cases of sexual violation, misunderstanding 
refusal is only part of the story. Misunderstanding is supplemented with a hostile attitude, and those 
factors together explain the lack of uptake of refusal. This shows that, applied to real life cases, the 
radical misunderstanding view is more radical than it needs to be. Someone who completely 
misunderstands refusal may not be hostile, or have bad motivations of any kind. After all, they 
sincerely believe that the woman has not refused (and usually this is taken to entail consent). There 
is no uptake of refusal, because they do not see any refusal. But if we allow that there is most likely 
some hostility, we can dial back the level of misunderstanding that is necessary to make sense of the 
uptake failure.  
Someone who is hostile may be in a state of partial misunderstanding, where although he 
does not fully grasp the refusal, he does not believe he has consent either. We can thus explain why 
perpetrators of sexual violence, including in the less serious cases, are blameworthy despite their 
misunderstanding.<9>  So it makes sense to focus on accounts of silencing that involve partial as 
opposed to radical misunderstanding. 
Of course, not all misunderstandings, whether full or partial, involve hostility. Take the third 
sort of silencing that McGowan identifies, ‘recognition silencing’. In this case, the hearer thinks that 
the speaker’s true feelings are not reflected in her refusal, and so it is not a valid refusal. The man 
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recognizes that there is an intention to refuse, but does not think that the intention is well formed or 
stable, and thinks that he knows better what will be good for the woman. This is a partial 
misunderstanding rather than a radical one, but does not involve hostility in the sense identified 
above. It is a form of benevolent sexism, rather than hostile sexism. It is, of course, misguided, but 
the motive that explains disregarding refusal is not itself a hostile one. This sort of misunderstanding 
may occur, but anecdotal evidence as well as psychologists’ findings about hostility suggest that this 
is not the most common sort of case.   
Finally, then, consider McGowan’s final category, authority silencing. Authority silencing 
involves a failure to recognize that the speaker has the authority to refuse. As McGowan explains 
using an example, “Suppose, for instance, that my department chair tells me that I cannot have a 
professional leave, but I falsely believe that only the dean can do this. In this case, I fail to realize 
that the speaker (in this case, the department chair) is in a position to refuse my leave request.” 
(2017, 45). The idea applied to sexual refusal is that the man recognizes that the woman intends to 
refuse, but does not believe that she has the authority to refuse, and so does not take her refusal to 
be successful.<10> 
Authority silencing does not always involve hostility. Sometimes a mistake about authority is 
a simple mistake, as the mistake about whether the chair has the authority to grant leaves. However, 
there are two ways in which authority silencing of sexual refusal in particular involves hostility. First, 
the belief that women do not have the authority to refuse sexual advances is unlikely to be an 
innocent mistake. It is not a simple evidence based belief, but an ideological one, and it is plausibly 
blameworthy. Accepting that women lack authority is likely to be motivated by hostile emotion 
rather than by evidence.<11> 
More importantly, as I shall argue in detail below, someone who takes lack of authority to be 
decisive in the sexual refusal case is blameworthy for that. That is, believing that refusal is infelicitous 
is one thing, but ignoring attempted (but supposedly failed) refusal is another thing. We can contrast 
the department chair case. If don’t believe that my chair has the authority to grant me a leave, then 
even though I see she wants to grant my leave, her desires here are irrelevant to my behavior. I 
should ignore her failed authorization, and go and check with the dean, and I am not blameworthy 
for doing that. However, in the sexual refusal case, seeing that someone wants to refuse should be 
enough to inhibit further sexual advance – continuing is blameworthy. So the notion of authority 
silencing can help us to identify both the way in which there is a misunderstanding of refusal, and 
the way in which there is a blameworthy disregarding of the agent’s autonomy. 
I begin by clarifying what authority is, and what refusal is. I go on to explore four different 
cases of authority silencing, from obvious legal authority silencing to more complex and subtle limits 
to women’s authority to refuse sex and sexual advances. These cases show that according to 





I will start by giving a brief account of what authority is. First, authority needs to be distinguished 
from power. Power is simply the ability to get things done. Authority, however, is normative, it is 
the right to make a determination, and thereby to change the normative situation. A highway patrol 
officer has the authority to issue a speeding ticket, which creates new duties for the recipient. A state 
has the authority to make laws, thereby obligating the citizens. I have the authority to tell my 
babysitter not to give my kids candy, and she is then obligated not to give them candy. 
Authority is not always backed up by power, even when the authority is not in dispute. If the 
driver of a getaway car sees a highway patrol car and simply puts his foot down, there is nothing the 
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highway patrol officer can do. The officer’s authority is not in question, but her power is. By 
contrast, an armed robber may have the power to extort money from passing motorists, but he does 
not have the authority to do so. No-one, not even the robber himself, thinks that he has the 
authority to demand money, but everyone recognizes his power to do so. Thus there is a fairly clear 
conceptual distinction between power and authority (I’ll come back to the reality, which may be less 
clear).  
 Authority, then, is a normative capacity to give others obligations. These obligations come 
about because of the authority, not because the other reasons point towards that course of action. In 
fact, if someone has an obligation that is brought about because of an authoritative determination, 
the obligation may not accord with the other reasons. A political authority may introduce a law 
against marijuana use, which is not backed by good reasons, but nonetheless, if the state is a 
legitimate authority that law is valid. In other words, authoritative commands have a ‘because I said 
so’ structure.<12>  
 This is why political authority is very hard to justify. It is not easy to see why someone would 
have authority over someone else regarding issues that concern that other person’s self-regarding 
conduct and well-being. How does a state have the authority to tell me not to grow marijuana for 
my own personal use? However, the authority I am interested in here is much less controversial. My 
premise is that we have authority (to at least some extent) over our own persons. We have the 
authority to decide what happens to our bodies and ourselves. I have the authority to determine that 
I will not eat meat, for example. And it seems obvious that normal authority over oneself includes 
the authority to refuse sexual contact. 
 When someone has authority, ‘because I said so’ is enough to justify the relevant 
determination. That doesn’t mean that it isn’t sometimes polite or helpful to give the reasons, but it 
is important to contrast exercises of authority with persuasion. Imagine two different conversations 
that I might have, one with my babysitter and one with my co-parent, about what to do with the 
kids over the holidays. When talking to my babysitter, we can discuss the reasons and disagree about 
what would be best, but in the end, I can say, ‘right, I know you disagree, but I have decided, they 
are going to camp.’ And because I am the parent, I have the authority, and so that ends the 
discussion. Whereas, when talking to my co-parent, neither of us can end things, neither of have 
more authority than the other, and so one of us has to persuade the other.   
A good test then, for whether someone has the authority to refuse something, is the extent to 
which we think they must give reasons, and convince their interlocutor that their preferred option is 
a good idea. The more normal it seems for the reluctant party to have to explain themselves, to give 
reasons, the less likely it is that they have authority to refuse. As Rebecca Hanrahan and Louise 
Antony put it, in discussing the way that women teachers face challenges in the classroom: “The fact 
is that the kind of authority that is everywhere and always open to challenge is…no authority at all. 
Having authority may not mean never having to say you're sorry, but it must at least mean not 
having to do it on demand” (2005, 64). 
This appeal to what actually happens – how normal it seems to give reasons – is an appeal to 
social reality. There is an ambiguity in the notion of ‘normative capacity’: are we talking about the 
way things should be, or the way things are? Women have the same official authority in the 
classroom that their male colleagues do, but students often don’t see it that way, and that means that 
in reality women do not have the authority that men have.  It is important to recognize that there can 
be situations where someone morally ought to have authority, but they do not. This takes us back to 
the discussion of illocutionary speech acts and sexual refusal. Some commentators worry that if 
there has been no refusal there has been no rape. So, we need to distinguish between what has 
happened morally, and what has happened as a matter of social reality. If a woman refuses sex, and 
she is sincere and doing her best to use the linguistic resources available to her, then morally, her 
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refusal is valid. But the social reality may not reflect the moral reality. So, when we say that someone 
does not have authority, we need to be clear whether we are taking about the moral situation or the 
social reality. A woman professor has the same moral (and institutional) authority as her male 
colleague, but she may not have the de facto authority.  
The point here is that heteropatriarchal norms in many societies do not grant women robust 
authority to tell people what to do in a range of contexts. One thing that women do not have robust 
authority to do is make sexual refusals.<13> Women, of course, have the moral authority to refuse, 
but not the de facto authority.  
This leads to the next question, which is how de facto authority can be gained and lost. Moral 
authority depends only on the moral situation. Legal authority is gained or lost through legislative 
action. De facto authority is gained or lost through social processes. I think it is worth mentioning 
two, though it is likely that there are more, and my rough sketch of these two is a simplification of 
many more complex sub-mechanisms. First, authority can be bootstrapped out of power. Ishani 
Maitra discusses various ways that authority can be gained (2012). (She is interested in defending the 
idea that pornography could have the right sort of authority to have illocutionary force, which is not 
an argument I am concerned with here). Maitra argues that there are various different sorts of 
authority, and describes how they can be acquired without legislative action. Most useful for my 
purposes is her idea that authority can be licensed. If someone acts in authoritative way and they are 
not challenged, they have effectively been licensed, they are accepted as an authority.  
 We can see how this happens in reverse, for example, to women, or to student teachers in 
the classroom. If their authority is not accepted, if they cannot get the class to accept their authority, 
they have no authority. So, authority can be bootstrapped out of power, and lack of authority can 
follow from powerlessness. That doesn’t collapse the distinction between power and authority: the 
difference lies in what is socially accepted. If the mafia takes over traffic control, people may at first 
stop out of fear. But as it becomes accepted that the mafia are in charge of traffic, it becomes a 
normative issue: the mafia seem to have the right to ask people to pull over. 
Another mechanism by which de facto authority can be gained or lost is ideology. Our 
narratives about who we are, what roles we suit, and so on, are of course ideological, and we can 
accept them even when it is not in our interests to do so. As Catharine MacKinnon and other 
feminists writing about pornography have argued, pornography is part of the social construction of 
gender and sexuality, and it normalizes and sexualizes women’s submission to men. Pornography is 
not alone in this. A recent video essay by Jonathan McIntosh documents the ubiquity of rape 
casually portrayed as seduction in films.<14> Such scenes are so common that McIntosh manages 
to make the point by looking only at films starring Harrison Ford.  
 Furthermore, everyday authority is masculine coded, as Hanrahan and Antony argue: 
“…typically male characteristics – deep voice, physical bulk – are implicitly used as markers of 
authority, while female characteristics – small stature, conciliatory behavior – are thought to make 
someone unfit to assume a position of power.” (2005, 73-74). What explains women’s struggles to 
maintain authority in the classroom, for example, is that the social markers of authority are 
incompatible with femininity. The authoritative professor is tall, deep voiced, bearded, and so on. 
Ideology permeates the subtle ways that we apportion authority.  
In sum, authority is a normative capacity, and it must be socially recognized to be effective in 
the world. When someone has authority in a domain, they can make a determination about what 
happens, and they do not have to defend it with reasons. This determination gives other agents an 






The term ‘refusal’ is used in different ways, but refusal in the normative sense requires authority. If 
women don’t have authority, then their refusals are not going to be taken seriously. As Austin points 
out in his account of the felicity conditions for illocutionary speech acts, authority is a necessary 
condition for performing certain illocutions. In order to marry two people, for example, it is crucial 
to have the right sort of state sanctioned authority. In order for a refusal to be a successful 
illocution, the speaker must have the right sort of authority.  
 To reinforce that point I will respond to a recent worry by Laura Caponetto (2017).  
Caponetto argues that seeing sexual refusal as an illocution requiring authority is problematic. She 
says that refusal is a “second turn illocution”: it is a response to an open call (like question-answer; 
greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance). So, the first step is that there is a proposal, or invitation, or 
something similar, and the refusal is then appropriate as a response. According to Caponetto, there 
are two kinds of open calls: simple requests (proposals, invitations, offers) and permission requests. 
The former do not require authority to accept or refuse, the latter do. Caponetto argues that this 
leads to a dilemma:  if sexual advances are proposals, no authority is required to refuse. But on the 
other hand, if we construe sexual advances as permission requests (“can I use your body?”), then 
authority is required, but the framework is sexist. Further, if there is a permission request, there is a 
tacit recognition of authority from the asker.  
My reply to this is that this misunderstands refusal. Refusal’s aptness is not limited to 
proposals and open calls. A sexual advance can be various things. Sometimes a sexual advance is a 
permission request, and I agree with Caponetto that that is not a good model, though I shall not 
pursue that issue here. Sometimes it is a proposal, (and I shall argue below that authority is required 
to refuse a proposal). However, refusal is also possible when there has been no proposal, and no 
permission request.  
Consider the Scottish habit of breaking into singing Auld Langsyne in crowds.  In this situation, 
the person next to you will expect to take your hand at some point in the song. They may, through 
words or gestures propose to you that you hold hands. However, they may simply assume that you 
will go along with it, and take your hand. Either way, you can refuse: a refusal is an appropriate 
move.   
Sexual advances are like this. They may be a proposal, but they may also take the form of an 
action that the initiator hopes/expects the other to fall in with. It is often the case that in perfectly 
benign contexts, there is no proposal but rather an expectation that the other will fall in. In a long-
standing relationship for example, this may be a reasonable way to proceed. It may also be 
reasonable in certain other contexts. There can be situations where ‘sex is in the air’, and it is not 
impermissible to make a sexual advance that consist of an action, a starting to have sex, rather than a 
verbal request. If the advance is unwelcome, the subject can say, ‘no, don’t do that, that is not 
welcome’.  Telling someone to stop doing something they are doing is a sort of refusal, and it does 
not require the person to have invited the possibility of that response.  
Let’s come back to Caponetto’s worries. She thinks that refusal is a special sort of second turn 
illocution, and that refusal only needs authority behind it if it is a permission request. I have argued 
that refusal makes sense even when it not invited, but the point about authority is independent of 
that. Is Caponetto right to say that proposals and invitations can be refused without authority? I 
think not.  
Consider this example: I invite someone to a party at my house. They politely refuse. 
Unbeknownst to me, that person is under house arrest, so they do not have the legal authority to 
accept, and their refusal, it seems to me, is not quite felicitous.<15> We do not normally think of 
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the authority required to accept invitations because we take for granted that everybody has that 
authority over themselves, but thinking about the exceptional cases where they don’t (as when they 
are under legal house arrest) makes clear that authority is required.  
A different sort of worry about the idea of refusal is voiced, in passing, by Daniel Jacobson. 
He suggests that refusal is not a speech act at all: “refusing sex is not necessarily an illocutionary act - 
one can also refuse by physically resisting.” (1995, 75). This is too broad an account of refusal: it 
conflates refusal and resistance. A felicitous refusal can be non-verbal, but it should not require 
resorting to physical resistance. Refusal is normative, it changes the normative situation for others. We 
can change the actual situation by fighting, by hitting, by running away. But these things are very 
different from refusing. Of course, refusal and resistance have the same expressive force – they tell the 
approacher that the approach is unwelcome. But it is important to keep refusal distinct from non-
normative attempts to stop something from going forward.  
This is not to deny that the word ‘refusal’ is used in looser senses. We might say that the dog is 
refusing to eat. All we mean is that she does not want to eat, and is not eating: we do not usually 
think that dogs perform authoritative illocutionary acts, though they express their desires. We also 
talk about refusal in cases where we really mean attempted refusal. We might say that a child is 
refusing to come out of his room. In fact, if we do not think the child has the authority to refuse 
that, and so we should really say that he is resisting us. 
Let me sum up the important features of refusal. First, a felicitous refusal changes the 
normative situation. It creates a duty to desist, and it creates that duty through authority. If we focus 
on the moral norms, an otherwise felicitous refusal changes the moral situation even if there is no 
uptake: the approaching agent has a duty to desist, even if he does not realize that. If we focus on 
the legal and social norms, it may be that the same refusal does not succeed in creating new duties. 
Under a particular social order, a refusal to sit in the designated area of the bus, or to take one’s hat 
off in the presence of a social superior, may not be permitted, and so does not have the desired 
normative result. The refusal is infelicitous.  
When I argue, in what follows, that women do not have the authority to refuse, I mean of 
course, they are not granted that authority by our actual social norms. But societies are not 
homogenous, and acceptance of social norms varies. Perhaps the patriarchal norms I describe below 
are on their way out. Nevertheless, my point is that they are accepted and internalized by a sufficient 
number of people to be worth examining. 
 
 
THE FRAGILITY OF WOMEN’S AUTHORITY  
 
I will argue that in societies with a broadly patriarchal structure, including the Anglophone world, 
women are denied robust authority to refuse sex or sexual advances in some circumstances. By a 
patriarchal structure, I mean that the society functions so that adherence to a certain set of rules of 
masculinity and femininity is enforced in formal and informal ways, and that power and authority are 
coded as masculine. In even a moderately patriarchal society, the social reality is that women have 
only a fragile authority to refuse sexual advances.  In what follows I will discuss four cases where 





THE MARITAL RAPE EXCEPTION 
 
The ‘marital rape exception’ refers to the inability of a wife to bring rape charges against her 
husband: the law does not see that as rape. Most countries in the world do not criminalize marital 
rape.<16>  On one understanding of the legal history, English common law originally treated 
marriage as a property contract. In marrying a woman, a man comes to own her, and as she is his 
property, he can do what he likes with her. In that case, the woman does not have the authority to 
refuse sex. Alternatively, but with the same result, we could understand laws as being based on the 
feudal doctrine of coverture: on marriage, the woman’s identity is subsumed under the man’s, and he 
can no more rape his wife than he can rape himself, as Sir William Blackstone put it in 1765.<17> 
It might be objected that the justification for the marital exception is not property or coverture, 
but prior consent. Alan Wertheimer, in his book on consent, takes it as obvious that the idea is that 
in getting married, the woman has consented to all future sexual relations with her husband (2003). 
On this interpretation, it is not that the woman’s consent does not matter, it is rather that it has been 
given.  
However, this account collapses when we focus on the fact that consent is generally revocable. 
In many cases of marital rape, the woman is clearly refusing. If her consent is important, why would 
it not matter that she is now refusing? Defenders of the consent interpretation of marital contracts 
may suggest that marriage entails consent to all future sexual relations and giving up the right to 
revoke that consent. But that is not consent, that is consent plus something else.  If prior consent 
cannot be undone, it is normatively equivalent to lost authority. In the case of the marital rape 
exception, we have a situation where a woman does not have the legal authority to refuse sex.  
The marital rape exception example also illustrates the way that authority silencing makes 
sense of the relationship between misunderstanding and blameworthiness. Imagine a man who 
genuinely thought that he did have the moral (and legal) right to have sex with his wife whenever he 
wanted to. We would nonetheless hope that he could see some reasons not to force sex on his wife: 
we can see how his behavior is morally problematic if he does. Sometimes, having a right to do 
something does not mean that it is blameless to do it. Consider this example from Julia Driver about 
a related phenomenon, what she calls the category of the suberogatory (1992). A student who has 
forgotten his pen in an exam asks the person next to him to borrow one. The person next to him 
can refuse. It is within is moral rights to do so. Yet, it is not morally perfect either, it is permissible 
but nonetheless blameworthy.  
If a man believes he has a right to proceed with sex, he believes it is permissible for him to 
do so. But we can see that even if he were correct in that view, he may still be blameworthy for 
proceeding. Proceeding despite seeing reluctance exhibits a hostile attitude, a disregard for the 
woman’s well-being and autonomy. The authority loss view captures the disturbing way in which the 
perpetrator takes harm to be irrelevant rather than non-existent. And it is consistent with what 
psychologists say about the hostile attitudes that tend to be present in perpetrators of sexual 
violation. A man who takes his right to have sex as being more important than his partner’s desire 
not to is displaying a contemptuous and adversarial attitude. 
The fact that the marital rape exception was and is so widespread reveals something deep 
and important about attitudes to women’s authority to refuse sex. In the Anglo-American legal 
system, the law has changed, but, I shall argue, closely related attitudes remain prevalent. Women 







One of the most common rape myths is the idea that a woman who flirts, or drinks, or is dressed in 
revealing clothing is ‘asking for it’, and that correlatively, a man who assaults or harasses her is not as 
culpable as he would have been.<18>  A 2017 survey by the Fawcett society in the UK found that 
more than a third of people agree that a woman who dresses in a short skirt and drinks alcohol is to 
blame if she is sexually assaulted.<19>  A recent review of the empirical work on the topic between 
1990 and 2015 has similar findings. (Lennon et al. 2017). The research also shows that men tend to 
blame the victim more than women do. In other words, there is a popular belief, particularly among 
men, that dressing a certain way makes sexual aggression inevitable, or explicable, or even justifiable.  
This idea is not confined to popular imagination, but appears in the law as well. Jessica 
Wolfendale (2016) discusses several US court cases in which judges and juries have appealed to the 
woman’s attire in justifying a lenient sentence. The idea that women are sometimes to blame for 
being assaulted may also affect the likelihood of a case coming to court in the first place. Lisa 
Frohmann (1991), for example, found that prosecutors were less likely to take on rape cases when a 
victim admitted to having had sex with the accused on a previous occasion, or having engaged in 
some sexual activity other than the non-consensual activity, or when she had been drinking (as well 
as various other ‘red flags’). These are the classic victim blaming conditions. The prosecutors 
Frohmann studied were making decisions on the basis of what they believed would hold up in court. 
In other words, they were anticipating the attitudes of the judges and juries.  
It is not completely obvious what the victim blaming attitude is committed to. One 
possibility is that it is a pragmatic point, that given the way the world is, a woman who dresses in a 
certain way will be in danger, and she should know that. Regarding stranger rape, the best 
interpretation of apparent victim blaming is probably a pragmatic attitude: that there are risks that 
should not be taken, but that of course the rapist is still to blame.<20> However, there is evidence 
that in acquaintance rape cases, there is a stronger claim, something more like: ‘she brought it upon 
herself’, or ‘she deserved it’.<21>  
One way to interpret the stronger claim is as the view that the assailant was so aroused that 
he could not control himself, and therefore has an excuse. As Wolfendale argues, we can see this as 
akin to a provocation defense: it seems that the argument is that men have been provoked, and so 
are not fully responsible. The provocation defense as it is used in law applies only to murder: the 
idea is that there can be some circumstances such that no reasonable person would be able to keep 
their cool. In such cases, there is at least a partial excuse. Wolfendale argues that the idea of 
provocative dress is used the same way. The background picture (which Wolfendale is arguing 
against) is that men have strong sexual urges, their sexuality is strong, primitive and untamable.<22>  
Thus women must be careful, and if they dress ‘provocatively’ they are asking for it. This shifts 
responsibility from the man to the woman, as Wolfendale points out, and is a troubling picture of 
gender relations. If that is the right picture of the way that idea of provocative dress is used in courts 
and in cultural discourse, it is clearly sexist, but it does not show that women lack authority. 
 However, we might interpret the tendency to victim blaming as an attempt at justification for 
sexual assault. An excuse accepts that there was wrongdoing but denies responsibility (or at least, 
denies full responsibility). By contrast, a justification denies that a wrong was done. This is 
congruent with the fact that perpetrators often admit that they had non-consensual sex, but deny 
that it was rape.  Many of the most common rape myths can function as a justification: women are 
temptresses, women enjoy it, nice girls don’t get raped, rape isn’t very harmful, she led me on, she 
was drinking.  
There is empirical evidence that victim blaming is used as justification rather than excuse. A 
2006 study of 41 incarcerated rapists in the UK found that 51% made comments describing women 
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as sex objects, whose function is to be sexually available to men at all times and 44% expressed 
feelings of entitlement, assuming that as a man they could take what they wanted from the woman 
(Beech at al. 2006).<23> A more recent US study of men who had not been convicted of anything 
but admitted to acts sexual aggression had similar results, summed up by the authors as follows: 
“Most perpetrators endorsed several justifications, with the most strongly endorsed items being 
“She had gotten you sexually aroused,” “She led you on,” and “You thought she’d enjoy it once it 
started.” The frequency with which these items were endorsed suggests that feelings of sexual 
entitlement are incredibly common among perpetrators…These men have not learned that their 
partners’ wishes must be respected regardless of how sexually frustrated that might leave them.” 
(Wegner at al. 2016, 11). 
  If these attitudes are interpreted as justifications, we need to examine how the justification 
works. One possibility is that the behavior of the victim prior to the assault is taken to signal 
consent. For example, Wolfendale entertains the possibility that appeal to provocative dress has a 
justifying function, that what is going on is that the way a woman dresses can be taken to signal 
consent. In that case, presumably, the courts (and public opinion) judge that the man had a 
reasonable belief that the woman consented. Thus he was justified in pressing on. We might think 
the same thing about flirting and other sexual activities, and acts such as going home with someone. 
Perhaps the man in these situations believes that the woman has consented. 
As with the marital rape exception, the idea that prior consent is being appealed to doesn’t 
hold up. To see this, consider again the fact that consent is revocable.  Even if we could assume that 
by dressing a certain way, or by behaving a certain way, a woman is signaling consent, she should 
still be able to revoke that consent verbally. A clear refusal should override any prior consent. But 
that seems not to be the case, rather, certain behaviors render subsequent refusal invalid. What is it 
for refusal to be rendered invalid in this way? The woman no longer has the normative power to 
refuse. So the justification in this case is not really prior consent, but rather, lost authority.  
Of course, this is a reconstruction of what may not be a well-formed theory in the minds of 
perpetrators and their apologists. But my story about the fragility of authority is a story about the 
ideology of patriarchy, and ideology works in complex and subtle ways. Ideological commitments 
may be un-self-aware. My aim is to uncover the entailed commitments of common practices in order 
to critique them. The suggestion that appeals to provocative dress are appeals to prior consent may 
reflect what an unreflective self-report would say. But on deeper examination that is not consistent 
with what the appeal is used to justify. 
A closely related case is the case where a woman’s work as a sex worker is taken to make her 
unrapable. One way to understand that is as a loss of authority. Think about the remarks that judges 
sometimes make. In a 2007 case, the judge ruled that ruled that the rape of a sex worker was not 
actually rape, but rather ‘theft of services’. Judge Deni said that prosecuting sex worker clients 
“minimizes true rape cases and demeans women who are really raped.”<24>  Judge Deni’s 
justification was that there had been prior consent. The victim in this case was raped at gunpoint: 
she was clearly attempting to refuse. Her consent or lack thereof is obviously not important, again, 
what is doing the real work is the idea that women like her do not have the authority to refuse sex, 
only the authority to ask for money for it.  
Consideration of the role of provocative dress or behavior shows that what we have here is 
not a situation where women never have the authority to refuse sex. Rather, and this is culturally 
familiar, only ‘good girls’ have the authority to refuse sex. And one’s status as a good girl is fragile. It 
can be lost, not just by doing sex work, but through wearing the wrong outfit, or drinking too much, 
or flirting, or going some way with sexual contact. And once authority is lost, it is very hard to get 
back. 
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Furthermore, both the belief that women do not have authority to refuse sex, and 
willingness to proceed with sex on that basis in the face of clear reluctance, reflect hostile attitudes 
to women. The ideology that tells us that women lack authority is a misogynistic ideology. The men 
who both embrace the ideology and act on their perceived entitlements are the men who 
psychologists characterize as being in the grip of hostile masculinity. The authority loss view explains 
the way that these men are confused and mistaken, but also how they are nonetheless badly 
motivated and plausibly blameworthy.  
To be clear, my claim is not that all instances of victim blaming can be interpreted as 
authority loss. My view is that some can be, and that the idea of authority loss is a useful addition to 
our understanding of victim blaming. For example, there are implications for education of both 
potential offenders and potential victims. Current education programs focus on the importance of 
consent, but perhaps what is needed is to stress that women always have the authority to refuse, and 
that they do not lose that authority through dress or other behavior. To put it another way, 
education programs should focus on the fact that men do not have authority over women’s bodies 
under any circumstances.  
 
 
HARASSMENT AND POLITENESS NORMS 
 
I have argued that perpetrators of sexual aggression often have a (possibly unconscious) belief, 
backed up by patriarchal norms, that women do not have the authority to refuse sex. This is why 
women’s refusals are not effective. We might think that the ideological myths I have been discussing 
are not widely accepted. In this section I will point to another phenomenon, not as serious as non-
consensual sex, but even more common, to support my argument that the fragility of women’s 
authority to refuse sexual advances is culturally ingrained.   
In the situations I discuss here, as in the previous cases of the marital rape exception and 
victim blaming, hostile masculinity can supplement the ideological view about women’s authority, 
and that will tend to make the man’s behavior worse. However, even men who are not in the grip of 
hostile masculinity may find themselves cooperating with these less catastrophic norms of limited 
authority for women. 
The standard patriarchal norms of seduction expect that men instigate sexual contact, and 
women are passive. Nonetheless, on the surface it seems that those norms allow women the right to 
refuse sexual advances. I will argue that on closer examination it becomes clear that women’s right 
to refuse is limited in subtle ways. This sort of harassment is not usually criminalized, and nor 
should it be, but it is worth examining as part of a problematic pattern: the heteronormative 
continuum. It is a sort of microaggression, which can add up to serious harm over time, and it 
echoes and reinforces more serious harms. 
Here is a scenario that will be familiar to many: a woman is alone, or with another woman in 
a bar, pretty much anywhere in North America or Western Europe. A man sends over a drink, or 
offers to buy her a drink, and comes over to sit with her. She attempts refusal, politely but firmly. If 
she is lucky the encounter ends there, but that is rare. There is usually a period of negotiation, the 
man insists that he would like to get to know her, that it would be nice for both of them. She refuses 
again, politely, and he may stop there, or he may go on. One way the women can end the interaction 
us by giving a reason, by saying, ‘I’m married’, or, ‘I am on a date’. But if the woman insists on 
politely saying no without giving a reason, very often, the man reacts as if the woman has been 
suddenly and inexplicably rude to him.<25> 
One thing that goes on in this sort of situation, (and also in more serious cases of sexual 
assault and date rape), is that the man takes advantage of politeness norms, to make it seem as if 
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refusal is rude. Women tend to be socialized to be polite and self-effacing, and it is possible to use 
those norms to bully women into consent. Again, many women are familiar with the regret that 
follows having, out of sheer unwillingness to seem rude, allowed a man to buy a drink, and then sit 
there politely while he bores on about himself. And that, of course, is the best case scenario.  
 However, I think a deeper analysis of the mechanism here is possible. Sometimes, what is 
going on in the bar scenario, is that the context is such that the man does not take the woman to 
have the authority to refuse his advances. (He might still think she has the authority to refuse sex, 
my point here is about her authority to refuse the interaction in the bar). Notice that what happens 
is the man takes the first ‘no’ as the start of a negotiation. If her refusal is accompanied by 
arguments that are not convincing to him, he presses on. He gives reasons, and expects reasons in 
return. It is tempting to give them – ‘I’m married’/ ‘I’m here on a date’ – those reasons are decisive 
and will (usually) end it. But why should the woman have to persuade the man not to sit with her? If 
the woman had robust authority here, she would not have to give justifying reasons. 
Bars are sexualized places, and being in a bar, at least a certain type of bar, gives people a 
license to make sexually motivated approaches. Different spaces give different licenses. But the 
situation for women in heterosexually coded bars is very different to the situation for men, and very 
different to the situation for people in non-heterosexual spaces. In many gay bars, sexual approach is 
expected, but refusal is more likely to be accepted without objection.<26> The entitlement that 
heterosexual men feel to women’s time is not functioning in a non-heterosexual space.   
So, the point about spaces is very similar to the provocative dress point: some behavior 
apparently constitutes the giving up of authority to refuse sexual advances. The same used to be true 
of spaces other than bars. Professional work environments for example, used to be like that for 
women. That is no longer true of the work place. It is also not usually true of restaurants, or 
cinemas, or public parks. But a woman’s status changes if she is alone in a bar. 
 I think this case can teach us something in addition to the role of venue in the risk of 
changed status. The fact that it is rude to refuse a drink, as indicated by the fact that both men and 
women feel that; the bar staff colludes with the man, takes his money and sends the drink over; and 
the fact that bystanders would rarely think anything amiss when a man walks over to a strange 
woman in a bar. (Contrast how bystanders might be expected to react if a man walks over to a 
strange woman in the street at night, or even in a public park during lunch hour). If I am right, that 
it really is rude (even if it shouldn’t be) that lends support to my claim that women do not have the 
authority to refuse the interaction. Our conventional authority norms are backed up by our 
politeness norms, so our politeness norms are a good indicator of what our authority norms are.  
There is a complication here. It seems that there are some things that I have the ultimate 
authority to refuse, but that it would nonetheless be rude of me to refuse. Consider again the 
suberogatory. A student has the right not to lend his pen to another, but we would certainly take it 
to be very rude if he refuses to do so. This shows us that our politeness norms do not purport to 
track ultimate moral authority. Rather, they track what I will call ‘quotidian’ authority. In other 
words, authority has two levels. There is ultimate authority, which is very strict: we have ultimate 
authority to do or refuse to do many things that it would be bad to do or refuse to do, such as 
refusing to lend a pen to a fellow student. Exercising ultimate authority may be socially awkward. 
But there is also quotidian authority, the authority that is absolutely automatic and accepted. We 
usually have quotidian authority to accept or refuse invitations to parties: I can say yes or no without 
it causing any ripples. Or even more straightforwardly, we have quotidian authority to accept or 
refuse a cup of tea.<27> In both cases it may be polite to give reasons as explanations, but there is no 
need to persuade, to treat the other as an equal decider in the matter. 
 Consider now a case where people have ultimate authority but not quotidian authority, and 
that is accurately indicated by our politeness norms. Imagine that you move into a new house in a 
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new neighborhood, and your neighbor leans over the fence and starts chatting, trying to get to know 
you.<28> It seems to me it would be rude to refuse to engage. But it also seems to me that although 
you have the ultimate moral authority not to engage, you do not have the quotidian authority to 
refuse to engage. Our politeness norms (and our conventional authority norms) accurately track the 
moral situation here: you should engage with your neighbor, though you do have the ultimate 
authority to refuse to do so. To put that in Driver’s terms, it would be suberogatory, but not 
impermissible, for you to refuse. In this situation, the conventional authority tracks the moral 
authority. We do not have quotidian authority to refuse to engage with our neighbors (a little!), and 
that is indicated by our politeness norms.  
In the case of women’s authority to refuse sexual advances, our conventional norms are less 
morally accurate. Our conventional norms have it that women frequently lack quotidian authority to 
refuse sexual advances. Now we have a fuller explanation of what happens in the bar, and why it 
seems rude for a woman to refuse a man’s attentions. In the bar scenario, there are two ways for the 
woman to end the interaction. She can give justifying reasons, for example, that she is married, and 
that will end things without conflict. But she has not asserted her authority there. Or, she can insist 
on asserting her authority. Because she is taken to have ultimate authority but not quotidian 
authority, this is rude. The encounter ends awkwardly, sometimes, depending on how much hostility 
the man harbors, with the man berating her for her inexplicable rudeness. That same man will very 
likely admit that the woman has the ultimate authority to refuse, and that is why, in the end, he walks 
away. But he thinks she has been rude, she has behaved badly, like the exam hall student who 
refuses to hand over his pen.  
In sum, reflecting on our politeness norms helps us to see the complexities in the picture. 
The sort of (social) authority that women lack is sometimes ultimate authority, as in the sex worker 
case. Women who are not sex workers can lose ultimate authority too, through their dress or 
behavior. But even if women are acknowledged to have ultimate authority, they may lack quotidian 
authority. I have argued that in mundane cases of sexual harassment, women lack quotidian 





I have been trying to show that the notion of authority silencing is a valuable resource in the project 
of making sense of the silencing of sexual refusal. Sexist ideology deprives women of de facto 
authority to refuse sex in some circumstances. I have argued that this is complex, varying according 
to situation, location, and other social factors. When women’s sexual refusal is silenced it is not 
usually completely silenced. The man often understands that the woman is trying to refuse, and is 
thus blameworthy when he presses on, even if he believes that her refusal is infelicitous.  
Thinking about authority loss can also shed light on cases where there is consent, but it is 
ambivalent. As Ann Cahill argues, the heterosexual continuum includes some heterosex that is 
consensual – but the consent has not been given in the right way, it has been finagled (2016). The 
sex may not be rape, but it is nonetheless ‘unjust sex’ as Cahill puts it.  
First, we can appeal to the distinction between ultimate and quotidian authority and the 
operation of politeness norms to explain why women sometimes feel pressured into sex. It may be 
that the woman recognizes that in this social order, she doesn’t have quotidian authority, and so she 
sees that there will be an awkward struggle. She will have to assert her ultimate authority, and having 
to do that is often very socially disruptive, as I pointed out above. Compare again, the situation 
where someone does not want to talk to their neighbor. In order to avoid it, they will have to be 
rude. This adds an extra cost, the social disruption.  
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Social disruption is a particular kind of cost: it is not just, ‘I will hurt his feelings’.  
Contrast the case where A, politely and non-coercively asks B out on a date. B will surely notice the 
fact that turning A down will hurt his feelings, and although that is a cost, it does not weigh against 
the action: it is sometimes necessary to hurt people’s feelings, we all recognize that. That does not 
disrupt things, it is not a transgression. We see that it is sometimes inevitable, a necessary ill. However, 
we have a built-in reluctance to transgress social norms.<29> And the pressure on women to be 
polite is usually greater than the pressure on men. Or perhaps, the politeness norms that apply to 
women are stricter than the politeness norms that apply to men: the threshold for what counts as 
rude is lower. Either way, politeness norms are powerful enough to be mildly coercive. 
I think that the pressure to be polite explains a lot of cases, but there is another way to 
understand the role of authority here.  Our tendency to internalize norms means that it is very easy 
to begin to think that the conventional authority norms are accurate, and so for the woman herself 
to think that after a date, or a series of dates, that it is unreasonable to refuse sex. Effectively, she 
accepts that she no longer has the authority to do that.  
I have described things very starkly in order to see the different conceptual possibilities 
clearly, but of course in these situations our perceptions are dim and muddy. It not that the agent is 
usually clear headed enough to think, ‘I lack authority here, so there is no point in refusing’. Rather, 
she might have a vague feeling that refusal is not an option, and not be able to identify why. She 
finds herself engaging in the argument, negotiating, as if she has no authority, and feeling something 
amiss but not being clear about what. Furthermore, it is important to us to think of ourselves as 
autonomous, so our own construction of the situation will tend towards an explanation in which we 
acted autonomously, even if we did not. And there are narratives to hand that lend support to the 
view that autonomous women consent to sex in these situations, that it is fun to be raunchy, that 
this is not being complicit in one’s own oppression or objectification, but what the modern woman 
does.<30> All these things make it hard to give any definitive account of how things really are. My 
point is just that it seems plausible that thinking about authority gives us some new and useful tools 





I have benefited from feedback on previous versions of this paper from audiences at Nottingham 
University, University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, University of Arizona, University of 
Groningen, University of California Santa Barbara, and the University of Tilburg. I would also like 
to thank Laura Caponetto, Guy Fletcher, Mary Kate McGowan, and anonymous referees for this 





1. I am interested in rape and harassment that is structured by gender hierarchy, and so I talk about 
cases where the perpetrator is a man and the victim is a woman. I recognize that rape and 
harassment are not always structured by gender hierarchy. For simplicity I will omit the 
qualifications about other possible forms of rape and harassment in what follows.  
2. See for example, Langton’s use of this distinction in her 1993. 
3. The feminist literature has focused chiefly on pornography, but other forms of entertainment are 
equally problematic: Hollywood movies, in which the woman’s refusal is a way of flirting, and is not 
to be taken seriously, pop videos, which objectify women, and advertising, which often has a 
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background story about women’s’ appropriate roles. These forms of media all provide cultural 
scripts, and plausibly, can affect our lives in problematic ways. I do not worry about the nature of 
the causal mechanism here. My concern is to elucidate the nature of the effect – that fact that 
women’s refusal goes awry – rather than the exact nature of the cause. 
4. One reason for the turn towards philosophy of language is to rebut the argument that 
pornography is protected by principles of free speech. The point of getting into the technical details 
of speech act theory is to make sense of the way in which women’s freedom of speech is limited. My 
view is that it is not so much the speech of women that is limited, but their rights. 
5. A large amount of literature on silencing has focused on questions about illocution and 
perlocution, and the distinction between them. (e.g. Jacobson 1994, Bird 2002). One point of 
critique is that it is not obvious that uptake failure should entail that there was no illocution: perhaps 
what we have is a successful refusal, but the perlocutionary effect failed. Furthermore, there is 
something slightly odd, and perhaps politically misguided, about saying that a woman did not refuse in 
a case where there is uptake failure. I do not engage these issues here. My focus is on why there is 
uptake failure, on what exactly the man who does not grasp the force of a refusal is 
misunderstanding.  
6. See also McGowan 2009. She discusses sincerity silencing further in McGowan 2014.  
7. As various critics of Langton and Hornsby have argued.  
8. This doesn’t reduce rape to individual psychopathology, rather, it recognizes that we need to talk 
both about the societal causes and the individual causes. It is important to note that, whatever the 
ideological story is, it does not affect all men the same way. Most men don’t rape women. So an 
account of the effect of sexist ideology needs to be supplemented by an account of what makes 
some men susceptible to it. 
9. A version of this worry appears in the literature on illocutionary silencing. Daniel Jacobson 1995, 
Alexander Bird 2002, and Nellie Wieland 2007 all object to Langton’s account that the responsibility 
of the man is, at the very least diminished. If the import of the word ‘no’ is ‘yes’ in this context, or if 
the conventional or pragmatic meaning of refusals in this context implies consent, then the man 
does not have the mens rea required for rape.  So there is no rape, as Jacobson puts it. Maitra & 
McGowan 2010 reply that the standards for finding out about consent are very high, so 
blameworthiness can usually be established. Antony Duff argues the same thing in the context of 
legal theory (1990). However, if sexist ideology is thorough enough to make it the case that refusal is 
incomprehensible, it seems also to be thorough enough to obscure the duty to double check for 
consent. See Mason 2021 for an argument about that possibility. 
10. Closely related to this is a phenomenon that might be characterized as a form of testimonial 
injustice. As Miranda Fricker puts it, “the dehumanizing sexual ideology is such that the man never 
really hears the woman at all—her utterance simply fails to register with his testimonial sensibility.” 
(2007, 140.). The idea is that a woman’s refusal is worthless, because she is not the sort of person 
who is worth listening to on this sort of topic. See also Hesni 2018. 
11. We can imagine an ideological and blameworthy version of the belief that chairs lack authority to 
grant leave – e.g. in a system in which chairs were routinely undervalued and deans had unearned 
power and privilege. Of course, more needs to be said about why beliefs of this sort are 
blameworthy, but I will rely on it being intuitively plausible for now.   
12. See Thomas Christiano’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Authority for a clear 
statement of that point: “The duty of the subject is grounded not in the content of the command 
itself but in the nature of the source issuing the command. The duty to obey is then automatically 
generated when the command is issued by the appropriate authority and when it has the right form 
and provenance. In this respect, the duty to obey is content independent or independent of the 
content of the particular command. One must obey because one has been commanded and not 
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because of the particular content of the command. One must do it because one has been told to do 
it.” (2013, section 1.2). Rebecca Hanrahan and Louise Antony make the same point in their account 
of authority (2005, 64). 
13. McGowan usually talks as if authority silencing involves a mistake on the man’s part: the man 
mistakenly believes that the women lacks authority. At one point though, McGowan says, “If all 
authority is socially constructed, then one might deny that the […] has the requisite authority”. 
(2017, 48). 
14. McIntosh’s Pop Culture Detective series examines sexist tropes in popular media.  
15. An anonymous referee points out that the agent might have the authority to accept, but not the 
power to go to the party without punishment. That might describe the moral situation, if her house 
arrest is unjust. If we assume that the house arrest is justified, then I would argue that authority to 
perform the speech act of acceptance is dependent on authority to attend the party. 
16. See Michelle Anderson 201 for an account of the legal history. The laws in US states began to 
criminalize marital rape between the 1970s and the 1990s. In Scotland the marital rape exception 
was abolished in 1989, and in England and Wales in 1991. 
17. Quoted in Anderson, op. cit. 
18. The idea of rape myths was introduced by Susan Brownmiller (1975) and is designed to 
illuminate ideology that trivializes, normalizes, or denies the prevalence of rape.  
19. The survey asked: “if a woman goes out late at night, wearing a short skirt, gets drunk and is 
then the victim of a sexual assault, is she totally or partly to blame?” Fawcett’s analysis reveals: 38% 
of all men and 34% of all women said that she is totally or partly to blame, and 14% of men aged 
18-34 say she is “totally to blame”. (Taaffe 2017). Other surveys find even larger numbers, e.g. a 
2019 survey commissioned by The Independent newspaper in the UK found that 55% of men and 41% 
of women believed that a woman in revealing clothes is more likely be sexually assaulted. 
(Oppenheim 2019).  
20. As Lindsey Kushner QC put it in summing up her judgment on a rape case: “I don’t think it’s 
wrong for a judge to beg women to take actions to protect themselves. That must not put 
responsibility on them rather than the perpetrator. How I see it is burglars are out there and nobody 
says burglars are OK but we do say: ‘Please don’t leave your back door open at night, take steps to 
protect yourselves’.” Quoted in The Guardian (Rawlinson 2017).  
21. For a review of psychological research on victim blaming in rape cases see Gravelin et al. 2019. 
22. This is Lois Pineau’s (1989) interpretation, for example.  
23. Some did appear to make an excuse: 15% said that they were unable to control their sexual 
urges. 
24. Philadelphia Municipal Court Judge Teresa Carr Deni. This case and others is discussed in a 
Salon article by Mary Elizabeth Williams (2015). 
25. A Saturday Night Live sketch (Girl at a bar) riffs on the phenomenon I describe (thanks to Matt 
King for pointing it out to me).  The frequency of this phenomenon is widely confirmed by social 
psychologists. See e.g. Kavanaugh (2013), a typology of sexual victimization in urban nightlife, or 
Graham et al (2014), a study which confirms that bystanders often encourage the aggressor.  Samia 
Hesni makes a similar point to the point I am making here in her discussion of illocutionary 
frustration. She argues that failure of leave-taking (ending a conversation by using conventional 
signals) can indicate a lack of standing: the speaker does not have the standing to use those signals.  
26. This is certainly true for women, but may be more complex for men, as varying (contested) 
constructions of gay male sexuality may muddy the waters of what counts as sexual harassment 
according to the social norms. 
27. The much copied Thames Valley Police animated film explaining consent in terms of offers of 
cups of tea support this: we can see that as recognizing that women do not have the quotidian 
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authority to refuse sex the way they do to refuse tea, and the comparison is an effort to put refusing 
sex back on a par with refusing tea. The animation is by Emmeline May, aka Rock Star Dinosaur 
Pirate Princess (2015).  
28. Thanks to Penelope Mackie for this example.  
29. See e.g. Sripada & Stitch 2007.  
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